Lightning Strikes
Each in-service aircraft is struck by lightning at least once per year, on average. Even if the level of energy of lightning strikes is high, their effects on an aircraft are limited.This article explains the lightning phenomenon and why aircraft are prone to lightning strikes. It describes how aircraft are designed to limit the effects of a lightning strike and ensure that the safety of the flight is not impaired. It also recalls several safety precautions to take in flight and on the ground, and what must be done when an aircraft is struck by lightning.
Cockpit Control Confusion
Inadvertent use of the wrong cockpit control instead of the intended control is a potential situation that pilots may encounter on any aircraft type. This kind of error can occur with even the most experienced pilots and this article explores what factors can influence and lead to this type of occurrence. The resilience of the aircraft systems to cope with such an error provides effective safety barriers to prevent serious events. The aim of this article is also to raise awareness of the potential causes and effects of cockpit control confusion incidents and provide information about best practices, which can help pilots to reduce the risks that may lead to operational and safety consequences.
Inadvertent Autopilot Engagement during Takeoff on A220 Aircraft
Several in-service events were reported to Airbus where the flight crew inadvertently selected the autopilot while attempting to engage the autothrottle during the takeoff roll. Inadvertent autopilot engagement may result in early rotation that can lead to a tail strike, inability to climb, runway overrun, or even loss of control. The purpose of this article is to describe the circumstances leading to this type of event with a case study and to provide details about the procedure updates and planned product enhancements that aim to prevent recurrence.
Thrust Reverser Selection is a Decision to Stop
The SOP for landing requests that the flight crew perform a full stop landing after thrust reversers selection. However, in-service flight data analysis revealed that the equivalent of one go-around per month is performed after selection of thrust reversers. This article describes an event where the flight crew performed a go-around after they had selected thrust reversers on an A320 aircraft. The reverser on one engine remained deployed until the end of the flight. The article explains how adherence to SOPs will prevent recurrence of this kind of event and describes the product enhancements that Airbus developed as additional safety barriers.
Non-Engagement of the Go-Around Modes in CLEAN Flaps Configuration
There were several events reported to Airbus where the go-around guidance modes did not engage when flight crews initiated a go-around. The analysis of these events indicated that the aircraft were on approach in CLEAN flaps configuration. Some of these events led to a high-energy situation toward the ground at low altitudes.This article explains why the go-around guidance modes do not engage on some aircraft if the go-around is initiated while the aircraft is in CLEAN flaps configuration. The article provides recommendations for flight crews if they face this situation. It describes the modifications that are planned to ensure that the go-around guidance modes engage when the flight crew initiates a go-around, even if the aircraft is on approach in CLEAN flaps configuration.
Use the Correct BARO Setting for Approach
Using an erroneous barometric reference setting during approach may cause the aircraft to fly lower than the published approach path, when the vertical guidance and trajectory deviations use the barometric reference. This can lead to a risk of controlled flight into terrain in poor visibility conditions or at night.This article explains the potential consequences of an erroneous barometric reference. It also provides guidance to flight crews on how to detect it, and describes the available system enhancements to alert flight crews when an erroneous BARO reference is detected.
Take Care of Your Brakes
All Brakes are subject to wear. Some brakes may also experience oxidation which can lead to brake rupture. In the case of a brake rupture or if brakes are too worn, the aircraft braking performance is reduced. This can result in a runway overrun if the full braking capacity is required such as during a rejected takeoff with an aircraft weight at or close to the maximum takeoff weight. Brake rupture can also lead to damage that can cause a brake fire due to hydraulic fluid coming into contact with hot parts.This article describes carbon wear and oxidation phenomena. It recalls the maintenance procedures used to identify worn or oxidized brakes, flight crew procedures, and good practices to prevent brake wear and oxidation.
Do not Wait to Apply the Engine Fire Procedure
Several recent engine fire events highlight the importance of timely application of the engine fire procedure. This article explains why flight crew must apply this procedure without delay. Decisive action when there is an engine fire alert may prevent further damage to the engine. This can help to ensure that a manageable fire situation does not become an uncontrolled fire with more serious consequences.
Prevention of EGT Overlimit Events
A number of engine Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) overlimit events at takeoff were reported to Airbus, including dual events leading to a significant increase in flight crew workload at low altitude. This article recalls the importance of monitoring the EGT margin of each engine to detect any degradation in engine performance early, and provides recommendations to Maintenance, Flight Operations, and flight crews to prevent EGT overlimit events. It also reminds us of what to do in the case of an EGT overlimit indication at takeoff.
Landing with Nosewheels at 90 degrees
In the past few years, several events occurred involving landing with the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) wheels turned to 90° from the aircraft centerline. The investigations identified the root causes, which were different for each event. Mitigating actions were developed and deployed accordingly. This article describes the outcomes of investigations into several events of aircraft landing with NLG wheels at 90° and shows why they are not related. It also recalls the corrective actions and existing operational recommendations to prevent any recurrence.