PROCEDURES
Thrust Reverser Deployment in Flight
Thrust reverser partial deployment in-flight events have been reported to Airbus which have had both a maintenance and an operational contribution.
This article describes a typical event, and provides a reminder of the recommended actions for the flight crew when an alert related to the thrust reversers is triggered at the gate or during taxi-out. It also provides maintenance recommendations to ensure correct thrust reverser de-activation task accomplishment.
This article supersedes the “A320 in-flight Thrust Reverser Deployment” article published in the Safety first issue #1.
The issue of the A340 ENG X REV UNLOCKED spurious alert, which was described in the Safety first issue #3 “A340 Thrust Reverser Unlocked”, is now resolved by the modification of the primary and secondary locks on all CFM 56-5C engines installed on A340-200 and -300.
A Thrust reverser unlocked event
An A320 aircraft equipped with IAE V2500 engines was prepared for dispatch under MEL with its ENG#2 thrust reverser deactivated following a thrust reverser fault logged during the previous flight.
At the gate, prior to departure, the ENG 2 REVERSE UNLOCKED ECAM caution appeared. The flight crew started the engines despite this alert and proceeded with the take-off.
The ENG 2 REVERSE UNLOCKED ECAM caution reappeared early in the climb. Moments later, due to the aerodynamic load, the translating sleeve started to move from its stowed position. When the position of the sleeve exceeded the threshold of the FADEC automatic IDLE function, the ENG#2 thrust automatically reduced to IDLE. The flight crew felt the aircraft vibrating, shut down the ENG#2 and then performed an in-flight turn back, landing the aircraft safely.
Subsequent investigations revealed that the ENG#2 thrust reverser sleeve had moved, during flight, from its stowed position. The automatic IDLE function combined with the fly by wire technology, prevented the aircraft from any sudden lateral upset. It was also identified that the lockout pin was not installed correctly during the deactivation procedure.
Similar incidents have been reported to Airbus. During a review of these events, there are common factors identified that provide useful lessons learnt. These include a reminder of ECAM caution management (or local warning on A300) by the flight crew and correct application of the MEL maintenance deactivation task.
FLIGHT OPS RECOMMENDATIONS
If the flight crew observes the ENG X REVERSE UNLOCKED ECAM caution before the start of the taxi-out phase (A300-600, A310, A320, A330, A340, A350, and A380) or REV UNLK local warning light (A300, A300-600, A310), they must refer to the MEL and ensure that the required maintenance actions are carried out.
If the alert triggers after the start of the taxi-out phase, the ECAM must be followed: it requires the flight crew to set the affected engine at idle and to shut the engine down. Consequently, the aircraft must return to the gate to perform maintenance actions.
(fig.1) Example of A320 ECAM action on ground
When a thrust reverser has been correctly deactivated by the maintenance, the ENG X REVERSE UNLOCKED alert (REV UNLK local warning light on A300) will not appear.
MAINTENANCE RECOMMENDATIONS
Maintenance Procedure for Thrust Reversers deactivation
Several safety measures are described in the AMM/MP Thrust Reverser Deactivation task. These include:
It is crucial that the maintenance personnel follow all the steps of AMM thrust reverser deactivation procedure and check that the ENG X REVERSE UNLOCKED caution does not appear on the ECAM.
This will prevent from any uncommanded deployment in flight.
Focus on the V2500 Thrust Reverser Deactivation
The events reported to Airbus occurred on A320 aircraft equipped with V2500 engines. An incorrect installation of the thrust reverser lockout pin is a common contributor for all the events where the thrust reverser deployed in flight, as it was the case for the event described in this article.
In normal operation, when the thrust reverser is serviceable, the lockout pin is stowed in the pin stowage bracket assembly located in the middle of each translating sleeve (fig.2).
In order to lock out the translating sleeve and to prevent the thrust reverser from moving, it is important to:
(fig.2) Location of the reverser locking devices
The outer end of the lockout pin will be visible from the surface of the sleeve whereas the collar of the pin will be below the surface of the sleeve (fig.3).
(fig.3) Correct Lockout Pin Installation
Cases of Incorrect Installation of the Lockout Pin
There are 3 typical cases of incorrect installation:
In this case, which is illustrated in (fig.4), the lockout pin has engaged with the outer cascade ring hole, but only partially engaged with 1 of the 2 anchor bracket holes.
(fig.4) Lockout pin partially engaged due to insufficient or incorrect threading
Turn the lockout pin to tighten by hand for at least 2 rotations to check that it has not cross threaded. If the grey collar of the lockout pin is visible above the thrust reverser skin, the lockout pin is not correctly installed.
In this case, which is illustrated in (fig.5, 6a and 6b), the translating sleeve is misaligned with the C-Duct due to an incorrect rigging of the translating sleeve. To correct this condition, check all the internal bumper shims and compression struts for clearance (Ref. IAE AMM TASK 78-30-00-820-010 Para. 4.B).
If the translating sleeve and the C-duct are still misaligned, then it is necessary to check the rigging of the translating sleeve actuator (Ref. IAE AMM TASK 78-30-00-820-010 Para. 4.C).
(fig.5) Misalignment of the translating sleeve with the C-duct
(fig.6a) Misalignment of the translating sleeve with the C-duct before lockout pin installation
(fig.6b) Lockout pin installed in a misaligned assembly
(fig.6c) Lockout pin correctly inserted
In both Case 1 and Case 2, the correct installation of the lockout pin will ensure to restore a retention mean but these configurations will not trigger an ENG X REVERSE UNLOCKED warning message as the T/R is fully stowed.
In this case, which is illustrated in (fig.7), the translating sleeve was not fully retracted and the lockout pin has engaged with the anchor bracket but NOT with in the aft cascade ring of the C-Duct.
This incorrect locking can happen if the sleeve has translated more than 20 mm from its fully stowed position. Any partial translation of the thrust reverser sleeve creates a visible gap between the translating sleeve and the fan cowl on both the right and left hand sides.
This gap will be clearly visible during preflight walkaround inspection (fig.8).
(fig.7) Lockout pin not engaged in the lockout assembly
Always confirm that the thrust reverser translating sleeves are retracted to their fully stowed position before installing the lockout pins as per IAE AMM TASK 78-32-00-860-011-A.
If this gap is visible (fig.8b) on a deactivated thrust reverser, the translating sleeve is not fully retracted: this means that the lockout pin was not correctly installed.
(fig.8) Correct and Incorrect position of the thrust reverser
(fig.8a) Reverser fully retracted
(fig.8b) Reverser NOT fully retracted
In Case 3, the correct installation of the lockout pin including the full closing of the T/R will ensure to restore a retention mean and to clear the ENG X REVERSE UNLOCKED warning message that was triggered.
Thrust Reverser Deployment in Flight events reported to Airbus have all been attributed to an incorrect application of the thrust reverser deactivation procedure. Confirming that all of the steps of the maintenance procedure are completed, T/R is fully stowed, and that the lockout pins are correctly inserted and secured, will ensure that the thrust reverser will not deploy in flight.
If the ENG X REVERSE UNLOCKED ECAM caution appears on ground after a dispatch with a thrust reverser deactivated, the aircraft must return to the gate (or must not leave) to perform the relevant maintenance actions.
If a thrust reverser has been correctly deactivated, the ECAM will not display the ENG X REVERSE UNLOCKED alert.
CONTRIBUTORS
Xavier JOLIVET
Product Safety Enhancement
Product Safety
Raphaël CERVAN
Propulsion system Integration
Engineering
Aurélie WOZNIAK
Flight Operations Safety Enhancement
Flight Operations Support
Eve NADAU CABAR LACURE
Customer Engineering Support
Nacelle Engineering Support
Cyril MONTOYA
Maintenance Safety Enhancement
Customer Services